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On May 25th 2012, in the closing session of the
Parliamentarians' Conference of the UN Population Fund
(UNFPA), held in Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Prime
Minister of Turkey asserted that abortion is murder, and thus
is totally unacceptable.1 Further to this, he stated that he was
also personally against Cesarean deliveries. Whether or not
the Prime Minister's statement was a sign for future changes
in the government's policies in the area of reproductive
rights, or indeed an indication of specific amendments to the
existing legal framework remains to be seen.2 This statement,
however, was not only incompatible with the existing legal
framework in Turkey, but also unheard of in the public
discourse a national political figure in Turkey. It served to fuel
a new debate within the country, and should be analyzeduthors as a part of the
ct. For information on
ll rights reserved.within the framework of governing political rationalities in
the country over the last decades.
Since 2002, in Turkey, there has been a transformation of the
political discourse and practice in regard tomany issues (such as
education, economy, or family) which is manifest in the policies
of the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP).
While the AKP has always defined its major identity axis as
‘conservative’, between 2002 and 2007, it emphasized its strong
commitment to Western democratic values and liberal
economic principles, spearheading Turkey's goal of joining the
European Union. In this period, it carried out a comprehensive
neoliberal program that prioritized economic concerns and
market rationality. However, particularly since 2007, patriarchal
and moral notions and values, often framed by religion, have
increasingly become dominant in the party's rhetoric regarding
the regulation of social and cultural domains, and even political
and international relations (Acar & Altunok, 2012; Öniş, 2009,
2012).3
It is also a fact that although the AKP government's
messages are often traceable to Islamic stances of its leaders,
the government's political rhetoric is not always explicitly
religious. For instance, the Prime Minister's anti-smoking and
anti-alcohol stance is mostly presented within a framework of
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his outburst denouncing abortion, the PrimeMinister refrained
from condemning the practice as a ‘sin’, but rather called it
‘murder’. However, it is obvious that even in the cases where
there is no direct reference to religion, there remains a strong
sense of moral judgment4 and a selective stigmatization of
practices that religion denounces. We argue, this indicates the
“regulation of the political on the basis of moral,” a readily
identifiable parameter of neo-conservatism. It is against this
background that this paper seeks to review the ‘politics of the
intimate’ in the last decade in Turkey, so as to understand the
impact of both neo-liberal and neo-conservative rationalities
and their conjunction on gender equality.
Conceptual terrain
By neo-liberalism, we understand a specific mentality that
involves the normative imposition of globally-contoured,
locally-actualized market rationality on political, social and
cultural spheres. It is also termed “market-political rational-
ity” (Brown, 2006: 693). ‘Neo-liberal political rationality’
requires the state to withdraw from the provision of welfare
services and to act as a facilitator, rather than a regulator of
economic relations (Brown, 2005: 50–59, 2006; Dean, 1999;
Larner, 2000; Lemke, 2001). Additionally, in neo-liberalism,
the state operates as an agent in the creation of a political
culture, where citizens live and act as individual ‘entrepre-
neurs’ who are responsible for their own welfare (Brown,
2006; Lemke, 2001; Olssen & Michael, 2005). They perform
as ‘consumers’, whose political relevance and moral auton-
omy is measured by their capacity for ‘self-care’ (Brown,
2006: 694) and by their market value. Such rationality is not
dictated by a ruling elite or a particular ideology, but rather,
is formulated as a result of the challenge, resistance,
negotiation and participation of many actors, including civil
society organizations and policy experts.
As with neo-liberalism, neo-conservatism is understood
here as a “moral-political rationality”, which in the words of
Brown (2006: 697), “identifies the state, including law, with
the task of setting the moral-religious compass for society,
and indeed for the world.”5 While the ‘neo-liberal political
rationality’ requires the state to withdraw from the provi-
sion of welfare services such as health care, education and
social services, the ‘neo-conservative rationality’ re-affirms
the state's existence in the political order by assigning it a
moral mission, circumscribed by discourses of patriotism,
nationalism, religiosity, culture and tradition.
While at times these rationalities may impose conflicting
principles, the conjoining of the two has led to diverse political
transformations such as the blurring of the distinction between
public and private or that between good and profitable, as well
as to the instrumentalization of the law (Brown, 2006: 695) for
economic ormoral purposes, rather than commitment to ideals
such as rule of law, freedom or liberty. One result of this
dynamics has been the weakening of ‘equality’ as a political
concern (Brown, 2006: 701). While for neo-liberalism com-
petitiveness, self-creation and survival are core values, for
neo-conservatism, egalitarian demands represent threats to
the wealth of property-owners and the existing social order.
The neo-liberal perspective views the state's redistributing of
economic resources as obstructing the rational functioning ofthe market and the neo-conservative stand perceives it as
having an interventionist role in the functioning of social order.
Much feminist work has already shown that patriarchy is
embedded in norms, laws and policies and economic and
social relations, and that modern states play a significant role
in regulating gendered bodies, sexualities and reproductive
capabilities. Gendered subjectivities, in particular woman-
hood, are produced and controlled through the private
domain (inter alia, Mayer, 2000; Yuval-Davis, 1997). While
the state's role is important in reproducing and regulating
gender relations, the perspective adopted in this paper
assumes that the state is not a static entity, or that gender
relations are not fixed and stationary. Rather, the state and
gender relations are both considered to be articulations of
dynamic, multiple and historically-determined power re-
lations, which can be resisted or transformed by oppositional
forces. The post-Foucauldian literature on governmentality
(Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996; Brown, 2005, 2006; Burchell,
Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Dean, 1999; Lemke, 2001) conceives
of government as ‘conduct of conduct’: that is, the technique
of governing individuals' relations with themselves, others
and the state via various social policies, institutions and
ideologies. A growing body of literature already exists on
how sexuality and gender have turned into the most visible
grounds for political struggle (as exemplified in LGBT
movements) in late modern societies (inter alia, Plummer,
1995, 2000). Nonetheless, a policy analysis of how these
issues have become subject to regulatory mechanisms within
specific programs and policies at a national level (Larner,
2000) is lacking, particularly in non-Western contexts. Given
the above, the present work may be seen as an attempt to
contribute to this existing gap in the literature by focusing on
the ‘politics of the intimate’ in Turkey in the last ten years,
under AKP governments.
Here the term ‘politics of the intimate’ is used to denote
the web of policies, decisions, discourses and laws and norms
which regulate intimate and family relationships, sexualities
and reproductive capabilities of individuals. Such a ‘politics of
the intimate’may be studied, in contemporary Turkey, on the
basis of three interrelated issue-areas: reproduction, sexual-
ity, and family and partnership.
The category of ‘politics of reproduction’ refers to the
regulation of human life as life i.e. procreation. Selected policies
and debates on reproductive choices, rights, and methods of
reproduction, such as population planning, birth control,
abortion, and artificial insemination, which have come to the
policy agenda in Turkey in the last decade, are reviewedwithin
this category.
The ‘politics of sexuality’ primarily denotes how individuals
are normatively constructed and regulated as sexual subjects
within a political order. A feminist perspective on this issue
points out the patriarchal aspect of these regulatorymechanisms
and how they function with regard to women's bodies. This
functioning is engendered by appropriating traditional and/or
modern values, such as chastity, motherhood or beauty.6 The
category of ‘politics of sexuality’ thus, includes the experience of
sexuality and sexual/gender identities; their expression, the
societal regulations of these identities, and debates on the sexual
rights of individuals. Legal discourse on sexual rights, sexuality
and the relationship between crime and sexuality (including, for
instance, whether a specific act is a crime because it is against
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individual or because it threatens a larger entity, such as family,
community or the nation) is included within this category.
Finally, the ‘politics of family/partnership’ refers to the
regulations of familial relations, such as marriage, separa-
tion, divorce, and de facto relationships, among others,
which reflect the socially institutionalized aspect of re-
lations that, at least in part, derive from sexuality and
reproduction.
As various scholars have already noted (e.g. Verloo, 2007;
Walby, 2005), it is possible to attribute multiple meanings to
the concept of gender equality. It may, for example, be
understood as the ‘sameness’ of the sexes, an understanding
that has conventionally required the provision of formal
equality (equal legal rights, equal conditions, equal wages
etc.) to women and men. Alternatively, when conceptualized
as the recognition of ‘differences’ in capabilities or contribu-
tions, gender equality rests on ensuring equal valuation of
the different contributions made by women andmen. Gender
equality has also been seen as a means of changing the
existing definitions of gender and gender relations.
In Turkey, many policy formulations, which have, in the
past decade, radically altered the relationship between state
and the individuals, reflect the simultaneous operation of the
two essentially distinct rationalities of neo-liberalism and
neo-conservatism.7 Where gender equality fares in this
landscape and how it is impacted by these (sometimes
conflicting and at other times allying) rationalities constitute
the question of this paper.
Politics of intimate in the Turkish context and
gender equality
The definition of gender equality as “the enjoyment of the
same rights” bywomen andmen has been the formal approach
adopted by the Turkish state since the 1920s and many legal
and institutional arrangements have been adopted to bring this
goal to reality since the early years.8 Over the years, the
evolving conception of gender equality has increasingly guided
the demands of the women'smovement and, particularly since
the 1990s, also impacted law and policy formulation by
governments. Following Turkey's EU candidacy (1999), gender
equality concerns did not only gain greater visibility in policies
but efforts to this end were accelerated particularly through
updating and amending fundamental laws (Constitutional
amendments in 2001, 2004 and 2010, New Civil Code in
2001, New Penal Code in 2004) with a view to eliminating
discrimination against women. In this period, civil society
activism, particularly the women's movement played an
important role in challenging the existing policies and norms,
and in formulating new policy demands.9
The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to
governmental power in 2002 was another significant dimen-
sion of socio-political development. As the first conservative
political formation with identifiable Islamist roots able to
form a single party government since the establishment of
the Turkish Republic, AKP was a novel experiment for the
country. Since coming to power, the AKP governments have
effectively surmounted neoliberal transformation processes,
and also acted as notable defender of a conservative,
religion-inspired and essentially patriarchal value system.These values and standards have become increasingly visible
in not only the domestic social policies and political projects
but also international relations of AKP governments. In this
context, particularly in the recent years, the neo-conservative
stance of the government has been increasingly unfolding as
a discourse that undermines gender equality by emphasizing
the centrality of the family institution by glorifying tradi-
tional gender roles.
The nature of selected policy debates and public dis-
courses as well as the contents of some legal regulations in
the areas of reproduction, sexuality and family-partnership in
Turkey, since the early 2000s, shed light on the specifics of
this process.
Politics of reproduction
On the occasion of the International Women's Day celebra-
tion on 8thMarch 2008, PrimeMinister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,
announced that his government was considering providing
financial incentives for births. Despite its declining birth rate
(in consequence of rapid urbanization and the implementation
of a consistent state policy of family planning) Turkey still
maintains a high overall fertility rate. This attitude, voiced at
the highest level of government was indeed a drastically
different position from existing policies of the state. It signified
an obvious shift from the anti-natalist population planning
policy of Turkey which had been adopted in the 1960s and is
still not formally withdrawn or altered.10 The change in the
political leadership's attitude was justified as a precautionary
step in response to the potential problems of Europe as an
aging population11 and has since been enthusiastically con-
veyed to the populace as a priority domestic concern.
For instance, it has since been standard behavior for the
Prime Minister to congratulate the newlyweds in the wedding
ceremonies in which he participates and to ask the bride to
promise that the union will produce “at least three” children.
Acting on his example similar recommendations are alsomade
by ministers, mayors or other dignitaries on these occasions,12
and routinely reported in the media.
The initial signs of a shift in population policies first
appeared in 2003, when it became clear that the new draft
Law on the Rights of the Disabled, included a clause that
aimed to bring restrictions on abortions carried out for
medical reasons. The Population Planning Law (No. 2827 of
1983), which was (and is) still in effect allowed for abortion
up to ten weeks on demand and after ten weeks, when the
mother's life was in danger, or when it was assessed that the
baby had serious health problems. The proposed clause
within the draft Law on the Rights of the Disabled, however,
prohibited termination of pregnancy after ten weeks where
the fetus was assessed as having physical or mental disability.
When this provision of the draft came to public attention as
an attempt to restrict existing legal regulations on access to
abortion services, conservative groups supported the pro-
posal but many objections were raised by women's organi-
zations, medical associations and some segments of the
media.13 Largely owing to such reactions, the proposed
article was later removed from the draft law.
The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main social
democratic opposition, as the long-time advocate of the
Republic's modernizing policies, criticized the government's
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three children’ would undermine the state's antinatalist
policy. It accused the government of being blind to the
economic danger of an increasingly growing army of un-
employed youth. It was pointed out that in the face of
structural problems such as unemployment, the ‘minimum-
three-children-policy’ would have a significant adverse
effect on women's health and welfare as well as on gender
equality in Turkish society.14 The Prime Minister, who had
spearheaded this new policy, also received criticisms from
some civil society organizations.15
In July 2010, at a meeting the Prime Minister held with
leaders of women's organizations, issues and problems of
gender inequality in Turkish society were brought up and
women activists expressed concern about the consistent and
exclusive stress on motherhood and women's role within
the family in his speeches. They emphasized the need for
policies to remedy gender inequality in Turkish society and
expressed their wish that the Prime Minister give more
active support to the realization of this goal by emphasizing
gender equality in his speeches.16 In response, Mr. Erdoğan,
arguing that women and men were different in nature and
that they should complement one another rather than
compete for equal treatment, declared that he “did not
believe in equality between women and men” but rather
“supported equality of opportunity.”17
As observed on this and other occasions, political
leadership's treatment of women's rights and gender issues
(Çitak & Tür, 2008: 463)18 has become increasingly colored
by the tendency to emphasize women's care-giver roles
within the family often identifying womanhood exclusively
with motherhood; an approach resulting in the outright
neglect of gender equality concerns. In the recent years, such
a moral and ideological stance, is often articulated through
statements of political leaders and public officials and
implied, suggested or proposed in the drafting of legislation
and designing of social policies.
Along these lines, in March 2010, the Ministry of Health
introduced an amendment to the “Regulation Concerning
Treatment Centers for Assisted Procreation”,19 setting out
rules concerning assisted reproduction techniques. The
regulation defines assisted reproduction as “practices that
are accepted by modern medicine as medical therapeutic
procedures and procedures that make the egg cell of the
future mother more suitable for fertilization by the sperm of
the husband through the use of techniques that ensure — if
necessary by ex uterine fertilization and implantation of
gametes or embryo in to the womb of future mother.” As the
language of the document clearly indicates, only married and
heterosexual couples are permitted to benefit from assisted
reproduction. The regulation also requires that both parties
give legal consent to the procedure, are alive and together
during the insemination process and that the process be
terminated in case of the death (of the husband) or in case of
divorce. It also does not permit third party reproduction and
egg, sperm and embryo donations.
Despite these restrictions, however, as having children is
highly valued in Turkish society,20 it has been reported that an
increasing number of couples, as well as single women who
would like to have children, took advantage of the advances in
medical technologies by traveling to countries where suchprocedures were allowed or not explicitly banned. In March
2010, further amendments were introduced to the said
regulation in order to explicitly prohibit the use of donor
sperm and eggs by clinics, and to ban doctors from acting as
agents for foreign facilities using techniques that were banned
at home. The new provisions prohibiting the use of donor
provided egg and/or sperm were justified on the grounds that
such a method would be contrary to the philosophy of the
Turkish Penal Code as the latter (in article 231) considers
‘concealing the line of descent of a child’ a crime punishable by
a prison sentence of up to three years. Feminists and women's
groups criticized this provision as contrary to women's
reproductive rights, their rights over their own bodies and
sexuality.21 In response, the Minister of Health argued that
identifying the father was necessary in order to prevent
possible legal complications related to inheritance of
property.22
Although the accepted international language refers to
“reproductive and sexual health”, in Turkey only the term
“reproductive health” is utilized. In this context, it is
noteworthy that in Parliamentary debates and the public
statements of governmental actors “sexual health” is hardly
ever referred to. The minutes of the General Assembly
discussions of the Turkish Parliament reveal that with the
exception of the term ‘sexual orientation’, the word ‘sexual’
is only uttered in conjunction with the words ‘crime’,
‘discrimination’, ‘exploitation’, ‘harassment’, ‘violence’, ‘at-
tack’ and ‘damage’. The word is never used together with
‘health’, ‘rights’ or ‘freedom’.
As premarital sexual activity is denounced and even
punishable by the norms of a significant part of society in
Turkey, issues such as sexually transmitted diseases, safe sex
among the youth and between adults and women's sexual
rights are hardly debated openly as policy issues. Consequently,
despite the absence of any de jure restrictions for publicly
provided reproductive and sexual health services, in most
settings adolescents, unmarried individuals, particularly single
women are de facto excluded from benefitting from these
services (Özvarış, 2010: 101). Awareness-raising efforts on
matters of reproductive and sexual health also often limit
matters of sexuality to marriage and motherhood and are
directed to adult married women.23
While traditional conservative social norms and the
resultant political rationality characterize large segments of
Turkish society and these have colored the approach of most
Turkish governments throughout history regarding reproduc-
tive and sexual health policies, in the recent years, neo-liberal
economic-political rationality has also come to play an
increasingly important role in shaping the state's policies and
their implementation.
The increased medicalization of birth and Cesarean
deliveries within urban contexts (Cindoğlu & Sayan-Cengiz,
2010) is an example of how market rationality functions to
impact this realm. In the last decade, a significant increase in
Cesarean section deliveries (an average of 36.7% of births in
2008 in public hospitals and 40.7% in all health institutions)
in the country have made these ratios distinctly higher than
the WHO-suggested rate (15%). Some have argued that this
trend is an indicator of Turkey's heading toward a more
costly medical delivery system (Koç, 2003). The increased
rate of Cesarean sections is more prevalent among women
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(Seçkiner & Tezcan, 2010) suggesting that Cesarean sections
are perceived as a more modern, professional, low-risk form
of delivery (Cindoğlu & Sayan-Cengiz, 2010).
Similarly, privatization of health services and the introduc-
tion of a performance-based scheme, the direct result of
restructuring the health system in accordance with neoliberal
rationality, are also having a negative effect onwomen's access
to reproductive health services (Ağartan, 2012: 167; Akın &
Özvarış, 2012). It has been argued that only few reproductive
health services are reflected in the new specified performance
scheme, which has now become the basis of budgetary
allocations for hospitals and clinics (Çiçeklioğlu, 2010: 86).
Likewise, along with the closure of neighborhood Health
Centers that provided easily accessible reproductive and sexual
health care services, including contraceptive advice to women
of low-income families and unmarried women, many women
are likely to have less access to these services in local
communities.24Politics of family/partnership
One of the most important aspects of neo-liberal
restructuring has been the transformation of the welfare
regime in Turkey.25 Since 2002, a structural transformation
of the social security and health care system, along with the
restructuring of economic relations, introduction of flexibil-
ity into labor market, privatization of welfare and public
services have taken place under the banner of ‘increasing
efficiency and profitability’. The detrimental impacts of
these transformations on women from many points of view
have been noted (Acar-Savran, 2008; Coşar & Yeğenoğlu,
2009; İlkkaracan, 2007; Kılıç, 2008). The welfare benefits
that most women enjoyed as dependents under the old
welfare regime have significantly decreased. Although this
change has been justified through the discourse of equal
treatment of all, the absence of any mentionable improve-
ment in women's integration into the labor force, such a
policy shift only reinforced women's relative deprivation
(Coşar & Yeğenoğlu, 2009; Elveren, 2008; Kılıç, 2008; Özar &
Yakut-Çakar 2012).
The hailing of the family as the pillar of society, national
unity and social welfare constitutes an important aspect of
this transformation. Relegating many social care services, by
providing minimal financial support to the family has
become a preferred method in the recent years. The policy
known as “Back to the Family”, initiated and implemented by
the Social Services and the Children Protection Agency
(SHÇEK) between 2005 and 2010, placed children who
were in institutional care facilities, because their families
were economically unable to support them, “back” to host
families by providing monetary assistance to these families.
The “Back to the Family” Program is a clear example where
the family, as the building block of society is both promoted
ideologically and used as an effective instrument of privat-
ization of care services (Kılıç, 2010). The policy is defended
on moral and humanitarian grounds with the argument that
the family is the institution which is best suited for child-
rearing and it is economically justified as an efficient system
(Yazıcı, 2012).The new approach of the state also supports foster care and
adoption over institutional care, with a preference for delegat-
ing care-work to families, and encouraging dependent and
family-based role of women. Within this scheme, women are
assumed as designated care-givers. The low public spending
level for services such as nurseries, preschool programs and
elderly care facilities not only point to the little value attributed
to care work, but also make women's participation in the
formal labor market difficult. As main actors undertaking care
and domestic duties, women remain either at home or in the
informal sector.
The neo-conservative rationality, on the other hand, con-
ceives the family as the kernel of social order. Such problems of
modern societies as domestic violence, unemployment, child
poverty and divorce are seen as related to the decline of the
community and of the family. Strengthening the family
institution is viewed as the effective remedy for these social
problems and other risks ofmodernization and economic crises.
Similarly, charities assume a social, hence political role in
undertaking the responsibility of social care and assistance to
the needy (Buğra, 2007, 2012).
In the last decade, the conception of women as ‘sacred’
mothers, keystones of the family structure and guardians of
the moral-cultural order has been more and more strongly
emphasized by the government of AKP in Turkey. A recent
reflection of this approach can be seen in a policy that
foresees monthly allowances to widows. Needy women who
have lost their husbands and are taking care of their children
by themselves are deemed to be eligible for this payment, on
the condition that they are not remarried or are in a de facto
union. While the provision of such benefits falls in line with
the usual functioning of a welfare state, in the Turkish
context, the rationale of the policy appears to incorporate a
strong community-based moral dimension. The continuation
of payments is dependent on the decisions of the local
authorities who are to periodically review the recipients'
personal and private lives.
On the other hand, admittedly, in the last several years AKP
governments have shown a keen sensitivity to and a genuine
concern about the prevalence of violence against women, and
domestic violence, in Turkish society. The apparent commit-
ment to improving existing legislation and efforts to develop
policies in line with contemporary international standards to
combat violence against women have been noteworthy. In this
context, the Turkish government's active support in the
drafting and adoption of the Council of Europe Convention on
Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and
Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) during 2009–2011,
was followed by the decision to ratify this instrument without
reservations (2012) in very timely manner. Being the first
member state of the Council of Europe to ratify the Istanbul
Convention raised expectations from the government both at
home and abroad. Indeed the government's efforts (often in
cooperation with women's organizations) to pass new legisla-
tion to replace the 1998 Law on the Protection of the Family
which had received criticisms for falling short of meeting
conceptual and practical standards, picked up pace in the
aftermath of the Istanbul Convention. These efforts resulting,
shortly afterwards, in the promulgation of a new law, entitled
“Law on the Protection of the Family and Prevention of
Violence against Women” (2012) have been generally
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law-making process as well as its outcome, i.e., the new
legislation, essentially revealed the policy-makers’ instinctive
emphasis on the protection of the family institution first and
foremost. Their moral concerns and limited engagementwith a
rights-based treatment of violence against women resulted in
the new law also falling somewhat short of the international
standards it was expected to reflect.26
It is important, in this context, to underline that the
government's policy-making strategy does not recognize the
essential theoretical connection between gender-based-violence
against women and overall gender inequality. Structural analy-
ses of the sources of violence against women and transformative
mechanisms of elimination, such as those of women's empow-
erment, are thus rarely offered by the policy makers (Acar et al.,
2007; Altunok & Gözdaşoğlu Küçükalioğlu, 2009). To put it
differently, violence against women is also not treated as a
serious ‘violation of women's human rights’ on the entire
spectrum of rights. Often it is conceived in a restricted way,
referring basically to physical violence and expected to be
effectively controlled through penal law measures. Also many
times, women are viewed as victims in need of protection and
violence against them is perceived as mainly a threat to the
family institution that also has a negative impact on children's
welfare. Therefore, women exposed to physical violence are
offered protection within the family rather than social, political
or economic equality in society.
Other such more complex forms of violence against
women as sexual violence or psychological violence, and
particularly those types that are associated with ‘culture’ and
‘tradition’ in the collective psyche, can hardly appear on the
public policy agenda. These forms of gender-based-violence
are documented in academic studies as well as the state's
own research reports (Arat & Altınay, 2009; KSGM, 2008);
yet they do not receive due attention in national policy
making. Similarly, early marriage, recognized as a form of
violence in international documents, including the Istanbul
Convention, is hardly ever considered a form of gender-based
violence in Turkish legislation or policies (Acar et al., 2007).
Politics of sexuality
Up until 2004, the Penal Code of the Turkish Republic was a
law that was adopted in 1926. Its provisions regarding sexual
crimes and crimes committed against women reflected the
patriarchal and authoritarian mentality that conceived of the
law as the protector of the nation's (and women's) morality.
While there had been a strong demand from women's
organizations and other civil society groups to amend or
altogether replace this law for a considerable time and several
efforts had been underway, finally with Turkey's EU candidacy
(1999), acting as a key catalyst, a new Penal Code (No: 5237)
was promulgated in 2004. In regard to sexual offenses, the new
law was celebrated as it replaced the notion of protection of
public morality with protection of the individual, and his/her
sexual and bodily integrity. References to traditional concepts
such as morality, chastity, honor or virginity were removed
from the Code. Custom killings27 which are clear reflections of
community control over sexuality were considered as aggra-
vated homicides and became heavily punishable crimes under
the new law. The Penal Code also criminalized marital rape inan effort to protectwomen's bodily integrity and human rights.
It prohibited genital examinations (i.e. virginity control)
carried out without the consent of the woman except when
requested by the court as part of a criminal investigation.
Despite these and other improvements, the new Penal Code
still fell short of fulfilling contemporary international standards
in terms of women's human rights.28 In the process the
political will to regulate sexuality in moral terms has been
visible particularly in the treatment of topics such as “honor,
virginity, sexual relations of youth and sexual orientation”
(İlkkaracan, 2008). In the ensuing years, the increasing
dominance of the neo-conservative rationality has further
legitimized and extended the grounds for moral regulation of
sexual matters.
In this context, a look at the legal framework and policies
regarding homosexuality would be of interest. As can be
expected, same-sex relations are still not a policy issue in
Turkey, despite the existing demand for the protection of the
human rights of LGBTs. Although homosexuality is not illegal in
Turkey, it has no specific legal recognition either. Therefore, no
specific laws exist to protect LGBT people fromdiscrimination in
employment, education, and housing or even from any violence
that they may be subjected to on account of their sexual
orientation. While compared to male homosexuality which is
actively denounced and often more likely to be a basis of
discrimination in society, lesbian relationships can remain
invisible and may be less likely to be perceived as a threat to
‘femininity’. Nonetheless lesbian or bi-sexual women may be
more vulnerable to sexual harassment and to the danger of
marginalization than heterosexuals. During the 2002–2004
Penal Code campaign, LGBT andwomen's groups acted together
to voice their demand for the criminalization of discrimination
based on sexual orientation, but these efforts failed.29
Transsexuals and transvestites, on the other hand, appear
to be the most disadvantaged group; their sexual identity
being the most ‘visible’ and ‘different’. It has been reported
that transgendered people are often denied access to
employment and are forced to work in the streets as sex
workers, leading to further problems of social exclusion,
humiliation and harassment for this group of people. This is
despite the fact that since 1988, transsexuality is legally
recognized in Turkey.30
Market-based rationality would not oppose gay and lesbian
rights in theory. Rather, from a cost-benefit perspective, a
neo-liberal political rationality “could be expected to support
and expand spousal definition that contributed to the privat-
ization of these costs, while opposing any expanded definition
that increased public responsibility for them” (Cossman &
Fudge, 2002: 182). In regard to neo-conservative political
rationality, however, LGBT demands for equal rights and for
partnership rights represent a direct threat to the traditional
heterosexual family structure. For this reason, in societies
where conservative or neo-conservative groups have govern-
mental power or have a strong social base from which they
may challenge the liberal perspective, the adoption of legisla-
tion, which recognizes LGBT rights, would be difficult.
Within this context, the Turkish case clearly verifies the
opposition of neo-conservatism to gay and lesbian rights. A
public statement made by the former Minister of State in
charge of Women and Family Affairs, can well exemplify this
stance. The minister stated that, in her opinion, homosexuality
20 F. Acar, G. Altunok / Women's Studies International Forum 41 (2013) 14–23was a biological disorder (a disease), and those inflicted should
be treated.31 It is noteworthy that the minister did not reject
homosexuality on the grounds of religion but employed a
medical discourse to stigmatize the phenomenon. Her state-
ment found support from conservative groups32 but it was also
criticized by some in these circles for its modernist tone. It was
claimed that by denouncing homosexuality as a disease, the
minister was using ‘secular’ language instead of a religion
based one that would classify it as a “sin”.33Conclusion
In seeking to assess the impact, over the last decade, of the
dominating political discourse and socio-cultural climate creat-
ed by the rule of the AKP in Turkey, we have argued in this
paper, that the normative and instrumental policies of the state,
increasingly colored by neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism,
have fed into each other at the expense of gender equality as a
political concern.
As the neo-liberal rationality emphasizes the efficiency and
profitability of organizations, as well as ‘gender-blindness’ in
policy making, groups that suffer from various forms of
inequality, particularly women (notably single and low-
income women) are excluded from the system, and remain
exposed to the detrimental impact of existing gender and
structural inequalities.
While neo-liberalism places emphasis on individual self-
reliance and the self-regulation of social and economic
domains, neo-conservatism ascribes greater moral value to
the private sphere, which makes disadvantaged groups more
vulnerable vis a vis power relations.
Here, within the conceptual framework of the ‘politics of
intimate’ in Turkey, the gendered impact of the conjunction
of two rationalities have been traced. The Turkish experience
indicates that in such a conjunction, women are increasingly
placed within the boundaries of the private sphere and their
subjectivities are defined with reference to the traditional
roles of care giving.
Family is crucial to the functioning of the neo-conservative
mentality and not only is it the legitimate domain for
experiencing sexual and reproductive capabilities, but it also
plays a crucial role in producing and sustaining the desired
moral order. The family also becomes vital to the functioning of
neo-liberal rationality. The welfare and social security services
of the state that are weakened under neo-liberal policies are
largely compensated for by mechanisms of the social and
private domain, namely the family and charity organizations.
In this process, regulation of sexuality becomes a central
concern of the neo-conservative rule. As the treatment of
issues such as abortion, homosexuality or the sexuality of
youth or unmarried women shows any challenge to the
heterosexual and patriarchal family structure is strongly
rejected. Reproductive or sexual right claims, therefore, do
not receive a response from the policy makers.
In such circumstances, the struggle for gender equality
may be limited to a struggle by women merely to conserve
their existing rights or it may even regress to a struggle for
survival. In Turkey, in the last decade, it seems that the
prioritization of the gender-based violence against women
issue in the state's gender policies, as well as the heightenedconcern of the women's movement with the state's handling
of this matter needs to be seen in this light.
Our argument in this paper has been that in Turkey in the
last decade, the definition of citizenship roles with reference to
the market (as wage-earner vs. other), and gender roles with
reference to the family (as care-giver vs. other) that flow from
neo-liberal and neo-conservative perspectives respectively,
have served to complement each other in both economic and
political terms. This combination has also resulted in the dim,
indeed unfair, recognition of gender differences and has failed
to provide equal valuation of the qualitatively different
contributions made by women and men. Furthermore, in this
period a rights-based account of gender equality as a political
concern, (whether understood as an egalitarian or a transfor-
mative project) has lost significant ground.Endnotes
1 In the same speech, he also said “every abortion is an Uludere” in
reference to the incident that took place in December 2011 when 34 civilians
were unintentionally killed by war planes at the South-eastern border of
Turkey triggering a strong public outrage in the country.
2 Following the Prime Minister's outburst, the Minister of Health
conﬁrmed that preparations were under way to draft amendments to the
existing laws in order to ban or restrict abortions. On the same occasion, the
Minister also stated that even pregnancies resulting from rape should not be
terminated and babies born as a result of such cases could be taken care of
by the state. Soon afterwards, the Head of the General Directorate of
Religious Affairs also made a public statement supporting the government's
position.Protests and demonstrations against these views were held in many
cities and towns across the country; thousands of women and men signed
petitions and the issue was given front-page coverage in the national media.
In the face of these protests, the originally proposed amendment to ban
abortion altogether appears to be withdrawn from the agenda. While the
amendment process is postponed to the next session of Parliament (in Fall
2012), signiﬁcant restrictions of the existing framework are, nonetheless,
expected.With regard to the expected changes, it is reported that while the
legal ten week limit for abortions on demand may be retained, there will be
a mandatory four-day period for reconsideration of the decision and the
existing punishment (one year imprisonment or ﬁne) for abortions with no
medical reasons beyond the ten week limit will be increased (up to three
years). Also the replacement of the existing Population Planning Law (1982)
with a new Reproductive Health Services Law is expected. Ensuring
availability of ‘morning-after’ pills in health institutions as well as
amendments and measures to provide for increased paid maternity leave
up to six months and social security coverage of services for “painless birth”
are envisaged with a view to promote the birth rate.
3 In this context, the decision of the ECHR in the L Şahin v. Turkey (no.
44774/98) case supporting the state's right to ban headscarves in
universities and civil service can be seen as a turning point that triggered a
paradigm shift in AKP's increasingly religion-inspired conservative dis-
course. On that occasion, reacting to the ECHR's decision, the Prime Minister
said that on matters of this nature the Ulema (Islamic clergy) — rather than
the Court, should be consulted.
4 In this context, commenting to the AKP government's position on
abortion, the feminist activist Hülya Gülbahar, has observed a shift in the
discourse from one that associated women with motherhood to one that
labeled women who refuse such an association (in this case, by claiming
their ‘right to abortion’ ) as ‘murderers’. (2012, June, 17) Hürriyet. Retrieved
July 1, 2012 from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/20777062.asp.
5 For Brown (2006: 697), the neoconservative promotion of state power
and its attribution of moral authority to the state is at odds with traditional
‘conservatism’, which is identiﬁed by its commitment to “a modest
libertarianism”, “frugality and ﬁscal tightness”, social and cultural modesty,
“reﬁnement, rectitude, civility, education, and discipline” and it also conﬂicts
with classical liberalism that defends a limited state.
6 For instance, while a given socio-cultural medium may aim to enlighten
and emancipate women by unveiling them, in another context, veiling may be
promoted as a symbol of purity or freedom. Societies may restrict women's
sexuality by such practices like virginity-testing, honor-killings or FGM,
21F. Acar, G. Altunok / Women's Studies International Forum 41 (2013) 14–23associating young women's virginity, with the honor of the community or her
sexual activism and promiscuity with the community's moral decline. For an
exemplary analysis, see Parla, A. (2001). The honour of the state: Virginity
examinations in Turkey. Feminist Studies (27) 1: 65–88.
7 Striking reﬂection of this changing relationship between the state and
individuals can be observed in the discourse of the new political elite in
Turkey. For instance, unmoved by the demands and protests of graduates of
teacher training institutions who are long awaiting appointment to the
public school system, the Minister of Education, in an unabashed neo-liberal
tone, has said “may they ﬁnd other suitable jobs!” The PrimeMinister, on the
other hand, in tandem with the neo-conservative position, has openly
declared his government's desire “to raise pious generations”.
8 In the recent years, some feminist scholarship has, increasingly,
pointed out the limits of the scope and approach of these policies. See inter
alia Bozdoğan S., & Kasaba, R. (Eds.) (1997). Rethinking modernity and
national identity in Turkey. Seattle: University of Washington Pres; Arat Z.,
1995. Turkish women and the republican reconstruction of tradition. In F.
M. Gocek, & S. Balaghi (Eds.) (1994). Reconstructing gender in Middle East:
Tradition, identity, and power (57–80), New York: Columbia University
Press.
9 In this period, the introduction of market rationality impacted the
nature and extent of civil society activism. Closer ties with international
community and increased funds coming from international donors lead to
the development of a “project culture”, transforming civil society activism
into an area that is largely colored by competition for economic resources
and donor preferences. On the emerging “project culture” in civil society in
Turkey, see Kuzmanovic, D. (2010). Project culture and Turkish civil society,
Turkish Studies, 11(3). 429–444.
10 A pronatalist population policy had characterized the early years of
the Turkish Republic in order to respond to the country's defense needs and
to address the shortage of agricultural labor at the time. See Akın, A. (2007).
Emergence of the family planning program in Turkey. In W. C. Robinson & A.
R. John (Eds.), The global family planning revolution: Three decades of
population policies and programs (pp. 85–103). Washington DC: The World
Bank. In the ensuing years, a rapid population growth in conjunction with
rising levels of unemployment, high infant and maternal mortality rates and
prevalence of a high number of unsafe abortions in the country had led to a
drastic shift and the adoption of an antinatalist national population planning
strategy, in the 1960s. This was formalized by the promulgation of the Law
on Population Planning (No. 557, dated 1 April 1965).
11 For an example of the new approach see: Erdoğan lashes out at birth
control in campaign rally. (2011, May 16) Today's Zaman. Retrieved May 1,
2011 from http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?
load=detay&newsId=244165&link=244165.
12 For instance in May 2010, the Governor of the Kırıkkale, at the opening of
an exhibition of handicrafts by youngwomenwhohad attended a local vocational
course announced that his governorship would provide free bridal gowns to
prospective brides from poor families, if they promised to have at least three
children after theymarry. See: ‘An interesting offer from the Governor to the
poor girls.’ (2010, May 05) Milliyet. Retrieved May 1, 2011 from http://
www.milliyet.com.tr/validen-yoksul-kizlara-ilginc-gelinlik-sarti/siyaset/
sondakikaarsiv/05.05.2010/1234009/default.htm?ver=31.
13 Medical Association of Ankara issued a press release which included
a critique of the Draft Law. It's dangerous for social rather than scientiﬁc
reasons (2004, January 14). Retrieved April 30, 2012 from http://www.ttb.
org.tr/TD/TD116/10.php.
14 For the parliamentary debates on the issue see: Turkish Grand
National Assembly Journal of Minutes Term 22 Legislative Year 1 Session 41
Volume 6, 5 March 2003.
15 The Turkish Medical Association, for instance, issued a press
release countering the Prime Minister's assertion about the reality of a
population decline. It predicted that with a population growth rate of 2%,
Turkey's population would be 87, 8 million in 2025 and further argued
that with 26.8% of women being in the reproductive age and 50% under
the age of 25, Turkey would not face a problem of population decline in
the next 30 years.
16 For examples of such criticisms see: Hülya Gülbahar. Prime Minister
listened to women carefully and rejected every suggestion. Uçan Süpürge.
Retrieved April 1, 2012 from: http://www.ucansupurge.org/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=835:basbakan-kadinlari-dikkatle-
dinledi-her-turlu-oneriyi-reddetti&catid=51:diger&Itemid=115.
17 For media reporting of the Prime Minister's statement see: A man is a
man a woman is a woman (2010, July 31). Retrieved April 30, 2012 from
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25119314.18 In the Third Congress on Women in Local Government held in 2007,
Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that there is no status comparable to
motherhood and that this is the reason why ‘our (Islamic) civilization’ has
placed Heaven under the feet of mothers, and not those of fathers (Çitak & Tür,
2008). In a speech he delivered on March 8th 2012, Erdoğan not only repeated
his emphasis on family and his identiﬁcation of womanhoodwithmotherhood,
but also strongly criticizes those who did not agree with the government's
approach: “This is how some approach the family. They certainly don't like it at
all; they fulminate against motherhood. They can't stand it. When we say
‘mothers’ they say ‘we are against mothers’. Women, women, women! Who is
a mother? Isn't she a woman?” See, Prime Minister's Terror-Message to
Women. Radikal. Retrieved April 17, 2012 from http://www.radikal.com.tr/
Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1081127&CategoryID=78.
19 Üremeye Yardımcı Tedavi Uygulamaları Ve Üremeye Yardımcı Tedavi
Merkezleri Hakkında Yönetmelik (Regulation on Practices of Treatment for
Assisting Procreation and Treatment Centers Assisting Procreation) Resmi
Gazete (Ofﬁcial Gazette):6.3.2010-27513 was ﬁrst issued in 1987 and later
amended in 1996, 2005 and ﬁnally in 2010.
20 In a study conducted with 400 participants, in two separate districts
of a large Turkish city, it was found that the majority of the participants
approved egg donation for medical reasons such as cancer treatment (80.5%)
or infertility due to age (64.8%), medical (or mental) problems in the family
(49.3%) and in cases where a previous child (46.8%) was disabled. Upon a
comparison of these ﬁndings with similar research conducted in Iran it was
concluded that “family-based culture of Turkish society” associates woman's
dignity and self-esteem closely with her reproductive capability and thus
has less problems with justifying/accepting practices that overcome
infertility See Isikoglu M. et al. (2006). Public opinion regarding oocyte
donation in Turkey: First data from a secular population among the Islamic
world, Human Reproduction, 21(1). 318–323.
21 Women's rights activists criticized the government for not publicly
debating the ban before its issuance and argued that it is discriminating against
singlewomen and gay couples as it does not recognize their right to beneﬁt from
the technology of artiﬁcial insemination to become parents. See: Pinar
İlkkaracan,Turkey bans trips abroad for artiﬁcial insemination. The World.
(2010, March 16) Retrieved April 12, 20111 from http://www.theworld.org/
2010/03/16/turkey-bans-trips-abroad-for-artiﬁcial-insemination/ and Turkey
bans trips abroad for artiﬁcial insemination. BBC News. (2010, March 15)
Retrieved April 12, 20111 fromhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8568733.stm.
22 In this debate it was also underlined that knowing the identity of the
father would help prevent those situations where siblings unknowingly may
engage in a sexual relationship with each other, although obviously the
probability of such occurrences would be very low.
23 In January 2012, AKP Ankara Women's branch initiated a program,
called ‘Mother Academy’. The 12-week training program declares its aim to
be the education of women for the raising of healthy future generations. The
training module starts with the education of women with pregnancy and
then moves to childraising, family care and ends with menapause.
24 The transformation of health care includes the introduction of a
model that is composed of a family medicine system, general health
insurance system and autonomous hospitals. Within the newly established
family medicine model, many reproductive health care services are
transferred to family physicians. However, it has been noted that the
provision of such services as the placement of intrauterine devices require
special certiﬁcates to practice, and there is a lack of family physicians with
such certiﬁcates, making many women unable to beneﬁt from low-cost
reproductive services. Another notable drawback of the new system is the
ceasing of free provision of “oral contraceptives, intrauterine devices, and
condoms” and of termination of pregnancy and other planning services by
the hospitals. See Akın, A. (2011). Günümüz Türkiyesinde aile planlaması
politikaları. Paper presented at Günümüz Türkiyesinde aile planlaması
politikaları sempozyumu. Izmir: Turkey.
25 The welfare regime of the Turkish state has been conventionally
deﬁned as a corporatist welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1999) typical of
the Southern European countries (Buğra, 2012; Buğra & Keyder, 2007; Buğra
& Yakut-Çakar, 2010). This welfare system was built upon the male
breadwinner/female homemaker family model. In line with the low female
employment rate in the country, women's access to social security has been
mainly through formally employed male relatives. Women have received
social assistance and welfare beneﬁts as wives, daughters and mothers, i.e.
as dependents. Despite a worldwide increase in female employment in the
last two decades, overall female employment rate did not rise in Turkey; it
even dropped from 33.1% in 1988 to 23% in 2007 (Buğra & Yakut-Çakar,
2010:518). While in a recent speech, the Minister of Family and Social Policy
22 F. Acar, G. Altunok / Women's Studies International Forum 41 (2013) 14–23Fatma Şahin, is quoted as stating this ﬁgure to be 30%, the Turkish Statistics
Institute (TUIK) data reﬂect it as 27.4%, as of February 2012. It has also been
pointed out that along with the rapid urbanization and restructuring of the
economic system,womenare increasingly involved in informalwork (including
short-term contract labor, casual work, part-time work, and home-based piece
work), which means lack of both job security and social security.
26 For a detailed discussion of the importance of integration into the
global community and particularly the role of EU (which has come to a halt)
for controlling the religious political rationality vis-a-vis the expansion of
women's rights in Turkey see Yeşim Arat. 2010. Religion, Politics and Gender
Equality in Turkey: Implications of a Democratic Paradox. Third World
Quarterly. Special Issue: The Unhappy Marriage of Religion and Politics:
Problems and Pitfalls for Gender Equality. 31(6): 869–884.
27 Custom killings denote murders that are committed in the name of
so-called ‘honor’ and mostly targeting women. While the terms ‘honor
killing’ or so-called honor killings’ are used in international terminology, the
Turkish Penal Code opted for the narrower term of ‘custom killings’ also
falling short of the expectations of the women's movement that worked for
the promulgation of the law.
28 Among these shortcomings, the law's preference in adopting the use of the
term ‘custom killing’ instead of ‘honor killings’; its failure to exclusively demand
the women's consent as a prerequisite for all genital examinations; its
criminalization of consensual sexual relationships of those aged between 15 and
18 upon complaint and its criminalization of the publication of obscene material
(whichwas seen as a threat to freedomof expression, particularly against lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) groups) have often beennoted by domestic and
international reviewers. For an evaluationof someof these issues by theUNTreaty
Body monitoring women's rights and gender equality, see CEDAW Committee's
Concluding Observations for Turkey, in 2005 and 2010.
29 For an analysis of this process and its outcome see Kurbanoğlu, E.
(2010). The LGBT and women's movements in Turkey: a comparative analysis
(Master's thesis). Middle East Technical University, Ankara.
30 According to the Civil Code, those who have had sex reassignment
surgery can receive the appropriate identity card (i.e. pink for women, blue for
men as everyone else) thereby receiving formal recognition for their new sex.
31 Faruk Bildirici (7 March 2010) Homosexuality is a sickness and should be
treated. Hürriyet. Retrieved April 30, 2011 from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/
pazar/14031207.asp.The statement made by the minister gave way to protests
and debates in the media. LGBT rights activists demanded an apology from her;
asking for her resignation and for charges to be brought against her. While the
minister did not apologize neither has any legal action been taken against her and
the government has not revisited the issue since.Turkey also opposed the Final
Communique of the 29th Session of the Conference of European Ministers
responsible for Family Affairs held on 16–17 June 2009, in Vienna, Austria which
stated “Family today means a variety of living arrangements and children in
Europe are growing up in different family forms. These may vary from one
country to another and change during the child's life course”.
32 Some NGOs, which are known to have conservative tendencies, wrote
a public letter which supported the minister. The letter deﬁned homosex-
uality as deviance, a religiously forbidden practice which is against human
nature, the family, society and the human race. It also asks the minister to
formulate and implement policy actions against the propaganda of
homosexuality. A blog site was opened to organize support against
homosexuality. See ‘Homosexuality is a sickness’, retrieved May 11, 2011
from http://www.escinsellikhastaliktir.blogspot.com/. In an interesting turn
of events, at this instance, the LGBT groups who had in the past supported
the lifting of the ban on women's wearing of headscarves at universities and
in public ofﬁces demanded veiled women's support (to no avail) in opposing
the minister's statement. As part of the rising politics of identity in the last
two decades, demands on the basis of sexuality, ethnicity and religion have
often shared the liberal foundation in asserting their ‘private’ identities to be
recognized by the state and made part of the public order.
33 For an elaboration of this argument, see: Hilal Kaplan. ‘Islam and the
issue of Homosexuality’ (03 April 2010) Retrieved May 11, 2011 from http://
www.taraf.com.tr/haber/islam-ve-escinsellik-meselesi.htm.
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